

# CHARITY FRAUD AND CYBERCRIME

# Welcome

## Charity fraud and cybercrime: Prevention and cure

SH $\infty$ SMITHS



Innovation Broking

# CHARITY FRAUD AND CYBERCRIME

# Your hosts

Connect with your hosts on LinkedIn by scanning the QR codes below.



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
# The duty of charity trustees (CC3)

## Section 7: Manage your charity's resources responsibly

- You must act responsibly, reasonably and honestly. This is sometimes called the duty of prudence. You must avoid exposing the charity's assets, beneficiaries or reputation to undue risk.
- You and your co-trustees should manage risk responsibly. You have a duty to avoid exposing your charity to undue risk. This doesn't mean being risk averse. Risk management is the process of identifying and assessing risks, and deciding how to deal with them. (section 7.1)
- You and your co-trustees are responsible for your charity's money. Your charity should have effective processes for handling money, to help avoid poor decisions and accidental errors, as well as theft and fraud. Failure to do so is likely to result in a breach of your duty. You should protect the charity from financial crime such as theft or fraud. (section 7.5)

# Prevention

- Better than cure
- Fraud Triangle
- Identify and Manage Risks
- Internal Financial Controls
- Culture
- Fraud Response Plan



# Detection and Investigation

- Implement Fraud Response Plan
- Get Legal Advice
  - Investigation
  - Reporting
  - Liability
- Example



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# Civil Recovery – Head or Heart

1. Consider what Primary Objective is – setting example, or recovery of funds
2. Recovery means investing time and funds to establishing what has happened
3. Investigatory – secure evidence, consider third party evidence, follow the money
4. Action- who and where is the target. Options include interim relief – freezing orders, search and seizure orders, asset tracing



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Partner

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


# Innovation Broking

## Cyber Risk

Jonathan Taylor  
Director, London and Head of Charities and Care  
Innovation Broking

# Cyber insurance





# Cyber insurance

<b>Cyber Incident Response</b>		
Incident Response Costs Legal & Regulatory Costs Security & Forensics Costs Crisis Communication Costs Privacy Breach Management Costs Third Party Privacy Breach Management Costs Post Breach Remediation Costs		£5,000,000 each and every claim, and overall, per sub section shown (unless shown otherwise)  £50,000/10% claim paid limit
<b>Cyber Crime</b>		
Funds Transfer Fraud Theft of Funds Held in Escrow Extortion Corporate Identity Theft Telephone Hacking Push payment fraud Unauthorized use of Computer resources		£250,000 each claim £250,000 each claim £5,000,000 each claim £250,000 each claim £250,000 each claim £50,000 each claim £250,000
<b>System Damage &amp; Business Interruption</b>		
System Damage & Rectification Costs Direct Loss of Profit and increased costs of working 12 months indemnity Additional increased cost of working Dependent Business Interruption Consequential Reputational Harm 12 months indemnity Claim preparation costs Hardware replacement costs		£5,000,000 each claim £5,000,000 each claim £100,000 each claim £5,000,000 sub limited to £1,000,000 for system failure £5,000,000 each claim £25,000 each claim £5,000,000 each claim
<b>Network Security &amp; Privacy</b>		
Network Security Limit Privacy Limit Management Liability Regulatory Fines PCI Fines, Penalties and Assessments		£5,000,000 each and every claim, and overall, per sub section shown (unless shown otherwise)
<b>Media Liability and Technology errors and Omissions</b>		<b>No cover provided as insured under another policy</b>
Excess applicable to Incident Response Excess all other claims		No excess for incident response £5,000 each claim



## Cyber Espionage, Cyber Crime, Cyber

COVID-19: Attack on Oxford University lab reinforces high cyber threats to virus research

**Severity:** High    **Sectors:** Pharmaceuticals medical supplies and health, Pharmaceuticals

Security researchers on 25 February reported that threat actors have compromised Oxford University's biomedical lab researching COVID-19.<sup>1</sup> According to the report, the breach took place in mid-February, when attackers left screenshots from inside the lab's network on a poorly secured server.

- An organised and capable cybercriminal group was likely behind the attack, seeking intelligence and intellectual property for financial gain. The attackers were likely seeking data to sell to, or on behalf of, a state actor.
- A range of cybercriminal groups are highly likely [to continue to target](#) organisations involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine development in the coming months. Such attacks will seek to steal data, extort ransoms or obtain intelligence to sell to third parties.

## Outlook

As vaccination programmes accelerate globally, cybercriminals will likely attempt to infiltrate or disrupt vaccine supply chains to demand ransoms from related organisations or steal data, as well as exploiting such programmes for identity theft and financial gain. When international travel gradually resumes, cybercriminal groups will also likely expand their focus to exploit growing demand for testing kits, such as by creating fake distribution websites.

In addition, state-linked threat actors in the next 12 months are likely to continue to target [healthcare and pharmaceutical organisations](#), and [vaccine supply chains](#), to serve intelligence requirements related to the development and rollout of COVID-19 vaccines and pandemic response efforts. Some nation states are likely to co-operate with cybercriminal groups, hindering attribution of such attacks.

## Mitigation

Organisations in or supporting the [healthcare and pharmaceutical sector](#) are advised to consult our mitigation techniques for [general malware](#), [malware distribution](#) and [ransomware](#).



## What can I do, its not my specialist subject?

- **Cyber maturity assessments**
- **MFA is now a requirement from insurers - get ahead!**
- **Good insurance is a must**
- **Employee education is key**

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