The proposed introduction of Remediation Management Orders ("RMOs") in The Building Safety (Remediation of Unsafe Cladding etc) Bill (Remediation Bill) raises a key question: if the Homes and Communities Agency ("HCA") and local authorities already have the ability under the Building Safety Act 2022 to seek Remediation Contribution Orders ("RCO"), why is a further remedy needed? The answer lies in the fundamentally different functions performed by the two regimes.
Published: 16 November 2026
Author: Sam Mullender
An RCO under section 124 of the Building Safety Act 2022 is principally a financial mechanism. Its purpose is to identify the parties who should bear the costs of remediation and require them to contribute towards those costs. The First-tier Tribunal (Tribunal) may make an order against landlords, developers and associated entities where it considers it just and equitable to do so. In essence, an RCO answers the question: who should pay? By contrast, an RMO is proposed as an operational remedy. Where there has been a compliance failure relating to the remediation of unsafe external walls, the HCA or the local authority may apply to the Tribunal for an order allowing it to take over the remediation process itself. This is described in the Explanatory Notes to the Remediation Bill as “a ‘remediation backstop’ power, enabling a public authority to step in and carry out remedial works where a duty-holder has failed to act. The order is intended to be a last resort to undertake the remediation of a building”.
The proposed order can confer extensive powers, including powers to enter into contracts, carry out works, exercise rights relating to the building and take practical control of delivery. The RMO therefore answers a different question: how do the works actually get done when the responsible party fails to act?
The following considers how the two remedies may operate together and examines some of the practical issues that may limit the effectiveness of the proposed RMO regime.
There are two likely scenarios envisaged by the Remediation Bill, outlined in the following examples.
Example 1: An existing RCO followed by an RMO
Consider a building where a developer has already been ordered under an RCO to contribute towards remediation costs. Despite the existence of funding, however, the responsible entity has failed to progress the works. The HCA or local authority therefore obtains an RMO and undertakes remediation itself.
This immediately raises a practical question. Who should receive the sums payable under the RCO? It is likely that paragraph 5(14) of Schedule 1 of the Remediation Bill is intended to deal with precisely this situation. The provision permits the Tribunal to include within the RMO such provisions as it considers "just and equitable" in relation to payments arising under the RCO.
That may include directing that outstanding RCO payments be made to the remediating authority, requiring sums already received to be applied towards the remediation expenditure, or providing for those sums to be taken into account when determining the amounts recoverable under the RMO regime. The breadth of the provision appears intended to allow the Tribunal to coordinate the two orders and avoid misdirected payments or double recovery.
Example 2: An RMO followed by an RCO
A different scenario arises where no RCO has yet been obtained. The responsible entity fails to remediate unsafe external walls and the HCA or local authority obtains an RMO. The HCA or local authority carries out the works and incurs substantial remediation expenses. Once the project is complete, the HCA or local authority serves a costs notice under the Remediation Bill.
At that stage, questions arise as to who should pursue those ultimately responsible for the defects – with the sole purpose of recovering the costs incurred. One possibility is that the responsible entity seeks an RCO to recover the costs it now faces. Another is that the HCA or local authority pursues an RCO itself as an interested person under the Building Safety Act 2022.
Who pursues recovery?
The scenario above exposes a potential weakness in the proposed regime.
In theory, the responsible entity may pursue an RCO. In practice, however, the circumstances giving rise to an RMO are likely to be those in which the responsible entity has already demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to drive remediation. It may be an underfunded residents' management company, a right to manage company, or an asset-poor special purpose vehicle with no appetite for litigation.
In the absence of the responsible entity pursuing an RCO, is the HCA or local authority likely to do so? Experience suggests they would have little appetite to pursue recovery actions of this nature. In circumstances where there is no incentive to pursuing the “polluter” rather than the responsible entity, costs would remain with the responsible entity to settle. This creates an obvious friction with public policy to date.
Will the Regime Work in practice?
The proposed RMO regime is ambitious in its objectives, but several further, questions remain as to whether it will achieve the desired outcome in practice.
First, the regime appears to assume that local authorities and the HCA will be willing and able to step into remediation projects where responsible entities have failed to act. Yet it is not immediately obvious why that assumption should hold true. In many cases, responsible entities fail to progress remediation because they lack funding, expertise, resources or legal certainty. Those constraints may apply to some extent to public authorities. Indeed, many practitioners' experience of building safety disputes is that local authorities are often reluctant to become directly involved in remediation projects beyond their traditional enforcement role. The Government guidance addresses this concern stating that they expect the backstop to primarily be used by the HCA “through a centralised approach, and that third parties can be contracted to undertake works and management of the building”.
Secondly, an RMO requires considerably more than regulatory oversight. In substance, the remediation authority is stepping into the position traditionally occupied by the building owner or employer under a construction contract. That role carries significant responsibilities and risks, including procurement, project management, resident engagement, contractor disputes, budget overruns, latent defects and long-term building safety liabilities. Those risks have only become more acute following the Building Safety Act 2022, which has imposed substantial ongoing obligations on those responsible for higher-risk residential buildings.
Thirdly, serious questions arise concerning landlord and tenant structures. The Remediation Bill permits a remediation authority to obtain extensive powers in relation to the building, including powers to carry out works and exercise functions that would otherwise belong to the duty-holder. Yet many buildings are subject to complex leasehold arrangements. Taking the common example of a residents' management company, the company may be responsible for maintaining the external wall but may not own the freehold. In ordinary circumstances, carrying out substantial alterations to the façade without the freeholder's consent could place the company in breach of its lease obligations.
Viewed overall, the RMO and RCO regimes are best understood as complementary rather than duplicative. The former is designed to solve the problem of delivery; the latter addresses the allocation of financial responsibility. However, the success of the regime may ultimately depend less on the existence of those powers and more on the identity of the party expected to use them. The Remediation Bill substantially strengthens the Government’s ability to intervene where remediation has stalled, but leaves open a number of fundamental practical questions: who will carry the delivery risk, who will pursue the ultimate wrongdoers, and who will, in reality, step forward to exercise these powers when remediation continues to stall.