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PlayStation meets energy: Competition law for ecosystems in transition
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The UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal’s (CAT) judgment of 17 November 2026 in Alex Neill Class Representative Limited v Sony may appear far removed from the energy sector. Its reasoning, however, raises important questions for energy markets undergoing structural change.

Published: 20 November 2027
Authors: Kiran Desai

The claim concerned Sony’s PlayStation ecosystem. Consumers buy a console, but subsequently purchase games, subscriptions and other digital content. Sony controls important elements of that ecosystem and uses revenues generated from subsequent purchases partly to support the economics of the initial console sale.

The CAT rejected an attempt to analyse digital PlayStation distribution (i.e., the games, as opposed to the console) as a narrow standalone market. Instead, it concluded that competition between rival systems (i.e., console, games and related products) could constrain Sony’s behaviour in relation to products purchased subsequently. Competition therefore needed to be understood in the context of the whole ecosystem.

That reasoning has potentially significant read-across to energy.

Increasingly, consumers are not simply buying electricity. They may acquire an EV charger, battery, solar panels or heat pump, together with an electricity tariff, software, optimisation services and participation in demand-side flexibility. Similarly, commercial battery operators may combine physical assets with optimisation, route-to-market and balancing services.

These developments raise a fundamental competition question. If a customer becomes substantially committed to a particular provider after buying the hardware, should subsequent services constitute narrow “aftermarkets” in which that provider potentially possesses significant market power? Or does competition occur between wider systems, with providers competing for customers on the overall attractiveness and lifetime economics of their proposition?

Sony suggests that technical lock-in does not necessarily establish economic market power. Relevant considerations include whether customers understand key elements when making their initial choice, namely, future costs, whether competing systems are available, switching costs and interoperability, and whether sufficiently important customers can and do respond to differences between competing propositions. The CAT also recognised that cross-subsidisation within a system is not inherently anticompetitive.

There are limits to the analogy. Regulated electricity networks, for example, are fundamentally different from competing gaming ecosystems. Statutory access obligations and economic regulation materially alter the analysis.

Nevertheless, the judgment points towards a larger issue. As energy markets converge around hardware, software, data, tariffs and flexibility, identifying where competition takes place becomes harder, and more important. Businesses may need increasingly to look beyond individual products or services and ask whether the real competitive contest is between rival energy ecosystems.