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Brand interchange | 3 min read
The “anxious pedant” & trade marks
Babek International Ltd v Iceland Foods Ltd
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17B078

In Babek International v. Iceland, HHJ Hacon has provided a useful analysis of the law on clarity and precision for trade mark filings, applying  Sieckmann, Libertel  and Cadbury. It is essential reading for all those filing trade marks and managing trade mark portfolios.

Published 4 March 2025

Case nameBabek International Ltd v Iceland Foods Ltd
Court: Intellectual Property Enterprise Court
Citation: [2025] EWHC 547 (IPEC)
Judge: His Honour Judge Hacon
JudgmentHere
Trade marks: UKTM 907527963

Mark description/limitation: “Gold oval with embossed BABEK writing. Colour Claimed: Gold, black.”

Class 29: Meat, fish, poultry and game; meat extracts; preserved, frozen, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables; jellies, jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk products; edible oils and fats.

Background

In March 2024, Babek International commenced proceedings against Iceland before the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court for trade mark infringement. Iceland accepted that it used an identical sign for identical goods, but asserted that it had the consent of the former proprietor or was under licence by a third party. It also counterclaimed that the trade mark was invalid.

Application

Iceland sought summary judgment on its counterclaim for invalidity, arguing that the registration did not satisfy the requirements of s. 1(1) and 3(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994. In particular, it asserted that Babek International’s trade mark was ambiguous and lacked clarity and precision because of, among others, the following:

Decision

HHJ Hacon provided a useful summary of the case law, concluding that the trade mark was validly registered and stating that Iceland’s arguments “assumed [a] degree of pedantry on the part of the competent authorities and the public which, if required in law, would make the trade mark system unworkable”. He reasoned: