Decision: Bargain Busting v Shenzhen SKE Technology Company & Others [2026] EWHC 933 (Ch)
Court: High Court of England and Wales
Judge: HHJ Matthews
Decision:  Here
Key issues: Contempt of court

Published: 13 May 2026
Authors: Shojibur Rahman

Introduction

In Bargain Busting v Shenzhen SKE Technology, HHJ Matthews struck out an application for criminal contempt, an emphatic reminder that contempt is an exceptional jurisdiction, not a routine litigation tactic. The judgment is a helpful read for anyone contemplating criminal contempt proceedings: the court will look for a genuine, realistic risk to the administration of justice, not sharp correspondence or robust submissions.

Background

On 10 May 2022, Bargain Busting applied to register the trade mark CRYSTAL BAR for class 34 goods (including electronic cigarettes and vape bars). Shenzhen SKE Technology opposed the application at the UK Intellectual Property Office under section 5(4)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, but the Hearing Officer rejected the opposition and the application was allowed to proceed.

Shenzhen SKE Technology then appealed to the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed. The parties subsequently agreed a form of order on 7 July 2025 requiring the mark to proceed to registration, while preserving Shenzhen SKE Technology’s right to seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal by 25 July 2025.

The next step sparked the dispute. On 14 July 2025, the UK Intellectual Property Office asked the parties for an update on the High Court appeal. Bargain Busting supplied the order (copying Shenzhen SKE Technology), and a short exchange followed with the UKIPO. A précis is set out below:

• 14 July (from Shenzhen SKE Technology’s lawyers): “… Please kindly note that the judge’s order … includes a deadline of 25 July 2025 to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal … We therefore respectfully request that no registry updates are effected at present …”
• 14 July (from Bargain Busting’s lawyers): “The order has immediate effect and applying for permission to appeal does not stay the order.”
• 17 July 2025 (from Shenzhen SKE Technology’s lawyers): “… we respectfully disagree. Our client presently intends to appeal the Order to which Brandsmiths refer … Consequently, … CRYSTAL BAR should not be registered until after either permission to appeal is refused, or, if it is granted, the final determination of any appeal … Allowing … CRYSTAL BAR to be registered effectively deprives the parties’ legal rights to appeal under paragraph 4 of the court order … The UKIPO is under a public duty to maintain the register of trade marks ensuring they are as accurate as possible. Should the UKIPO proceed to register this mark but later the court decides that the mark should not be registered and the UKIPO has to cancel the registration, it will be wasting the UKIPO’s time. Innocent third parties who rely on the UKIPO’ register during that period may also be misled by the status of … CRYSTAL BAR …”
• 24 July (from Bargain Busting’s lawyers): “The wording of the Order was agreed by the parties in advance of it being finalised and handed down by the High Court. If SKE … wanted the registration of the mark to be dependent or contingent ‘until after eitherpermission to appeal is refused, or, if it is granted, the final determination of any appeal’, they should have made this clear at the appropriate time and suggested amendments to the wording of the Order to be agreed and finalised in advance of it being handed down, but this did not happen. Paragraph 2 of the Order states that ‘[CRYSTAL BAR] shall proceed to registration’ … an appeal does not operate as a stay … we are extremely concerned that [Shenzhen SKE Technology’s lawyers are] attempting to mislead the Tribunal and interfere with the due administration of justice by seeking to call into question a mandatory Order from a High Court judge …”

Bargain Busting subsequently issued an application for criminal contempt (alleging intentional interference with the administration of justice) against Shenzhen SKE Technology and its lawyers. It also warned the UK Intellectual Property Office that High Court proceedings would follow if the mark was not registered by 16:00 on 27 August 2025. The UK Intellectual Property Office did not register the mark, but instead listed a hearing before Dr James Porter (Chief Hearing Officer) on 12 September 2025. Given the contempt allegations, Shenzhen SKE Technology and its lawyers attended that hearing but made no representations. In parallel, Shenzhen SKE Technology sought permission to appeal and applied to vary the High Court order to secure a stay pending any appeal.

In his decision, the Hearing Officer noted that Shenzhen SKE Technology’s request (to leave the register unchanged until all routes of appeal were exhausted) was common before the UK Intellectual Property Office (it arising from the long standing practice in Planet Epos v. Nettec Solutions BL O/373/02). He also noted that the Trade Marks Manual, while not binding, indicated that the Planet Epos applies to all levels of appeal, including to the Court of Appeal. However, he noted that, in practice, the specific issue had not been addressed (either because the High Court order expressly provides for a stay or because the parties adopt a pragmatic approach, waiting until all routes of appeal are exhausted). He then concluded:

“It is clearly unsatisfactory for rights to come on and off the register, leaving third parties and the wider public in a position of considerable uncertainty. Having rights appear and disappear (or vice versa) may raise significant questions over the status of infringing acts, and third party terms may be needed to regularise the position of parties. It may also lead to considerable uncertainty in proceedings where the existence of earlier registered rights is relied upon.

However, despite the practical concerns, I conclude that POINT FOUR does not establish that the Registrar can leave the register unchanged in light of a court order.”

Shenzhen SKE Technology then applied to strike out the contempt allegations. That application came before HHJ Matthews.

Decision

HHJ Matthews drew on (among other authorities) BHP Group (UK) Limited v Municipio de Mariana [2026] EWCA Civ 294, which distilled eight principles governing criminal contempt. Against that framework, he made the following findings:

• requests are not “misstatements”: Much of the relied-upon conduct was framed as requests or submissions, not statements of fact. A request that a public body take (or refrain from taking) a step cannot, in itself, be false or misleading in the way required for contempt.
• no realistic risk of interference: The UKIPO alone controlled whether the mark would be registered. It was aware of the legal position and could not be compelled by the parties, so the respondents’ conduct could not affect (or realistically risk affecting) the outcome.
• aligned with longstanding UKIPO practice: The representations sat comfortably with the UKIPO’s established approach of pausing implementation pending appeals, making it harder to characterise the conduct as improper.
• robust arguments are not contempt: Parties are entitled to advance submissions about how the law applies. The fact an argument is rejected does not make it improper, still less contemptuous.
• public interest threshold not met: Criminal contempt protects the public interest in the administration of justice, not private litigation advantage. The court saw no evidence of an intention to interfere with justice, and the threshold was not approached.

On that basis, he struck out the contempt application: the pleaded conduct did not meet the legal threshold for criminal contempt, there was no real risk to the administration of justice, and the claim disclosed no reasonable grounds.

Comment

In striking out the application, HHJ Matthews also stepped back to make broader, timely observations about how contempt is being used in modern litigation:

“What has happened in this case is nowadays an increasing problem for the courts. The courts now see even small (alleged) breaches of any orders, not necessarily injunctions, and indeed the conduct of litigation more generally, being threatened with contempt proceedings. In the old days, there would simply have been an application to enforce the original order. As one might expect, and as has happened here, such proceedings being launched are then often followed by applications from the respondents to strike out those proceedings. This slows down the litigation and consumes a lot of time and money. It is trite to say that the contempt jurisdiction is being ‘weaponised’ in a way that it has not been before. Certainly, I do not recall anything of this kind when I first started to practise law in the 1980s. Contempt applications were rare beasts, reserved for serious cases of non-compliance with injunctions or orders for specific performance, or for serious disruption of court hearings and interference with juries.

I appreciate that the contempt jurisdiction may be viewed by some litigators today as just another stick to beat your opponent with: the old adage is transmuted for modern times to All’s fair in love and litigation. In some cases, too, it may also be seen as a marketing tool for professionals, whether lawyers or others, to show how strong and fearless they are, and how committed they are to their clients’ cases. But in my judgment these are notfunctions of the contempt jurisdiction at all. Worse, and as I have said, its misuse consumes valuable judicial and legal resources, and costs a great deal of money. And this cannot help but prejudice other litigants seeking to have their disputes settled sooner rather than later. This is an unnecessary burden on society. In my judgment, the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised only where it is properly justified, and the courts should be vigilant to see that its exercise is so confined.”

The takeaway is simple but important: contempt is for serious misconduct that poses a real risk to the administration of justice. If the complaint is really about how an order should be implemented (or whether a step should be paused pending appeal)  the court will expect parties to use the ordinary procedural tools, not the criminal contempt jurisdiction.